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Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 commenced on 1 July 1998 and was enacted primarily to answer the 
serious complaints made to the Reid Committee about the allegedly unconscionable conduct of lessors in their 
dealings with small traders in retail shopping complexes. Since then New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland 
have enacted derivative provisions in their retail shop leasing legislation allowing retail leasing tribunals to consider 
instances of unconscionable conduct by lessors. This is the first article that critically analyses how s 51AC and its 
cognate provisions in the States have been applied by the courts and retail leasing tribunals against the background 
of existing literature and the High Court decision of ACCC v Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51, which 
dealt specifically with the application of s 51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to retail leasing situations. The article 
examines the types of lessor conduct retail lessees have claimed is unconscionable and concludes with the finding 
that the situations in which a lessor’s conduct is likely to be unconscionable under s 51AC have generally been 
limited to circumstances where a lessor's manipulation of their position or legal rights to deliberately force the 
termination of the lease or cessation of the lessee’s business is clearly evident. 
 
 
Context 
Those who follow the fortunes (or misfortunes) of the small business lessee will recall that it was 
the publishing of the findings of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, 
Science and Technology in 1997 in a Report entitled Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading 
in Australia (the Reid Report) which shed a spotlight on the plight of small business owners, 
particularly those with leases in major retail shopping centres. Much literature exists, apart from 
the Reid Report, upon the complaints of these retailers who instanced a number of occasions 
when large shopping centre owners had taken advantage of what was obviously their superior 
bargaining power to the detriment of those small businesses.3 An immediate response to the 
Reid Report was the enactment of s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) which came 
into effect on 1 July 1998. At this time the Trade Practices Act already included s 51AA, which 
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was inserted in 1992, and provides that “a corporation must not, in trade or commerce, engage 
in conduct that is unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law”.4 Shortly after the 
passage of s 51AA there were calls for further reform.5 Consequently, when s 51AC appeared 
on 1 July 1998, much speculation ensued about its true reach, particularly as s 51AA remained 
in the Act and by s 51AA(2) expressly declared that the section did not apply to conduct 
prohibited by s 51AB or s 51AC. It is not proposed here to repeat the considerable academic 
writings, mainly in the form of speculation, as to the true place of s 51AC and the relationship 
with s 51AA as these have been more than adequately canvassed elsewhere6 and no further 
light has since been shed by the authorities on this issue. After a brief survey of the 
commentators, and the limited case law on s 51AC, this article intends to examine how s 51AC 
is being used by lessees and whether the section is delivering relief from the type of unfair 
practices which precipitated the Reid Report. Whilst it is clear that a lessee will not be entitled to 
relief where the lessor is merely exercising its strict legal rights,7 the point at which a lessor 
steps over the line is less clear. Adoption of a simple “you will know it when you see it”8 test, 
while not presenting any difficulty for overwhelming cases of “unreasonable, unfair, bullying and 
thuggish behaviour”,9 does not assist in the case of borderline activity within complex factual 
situations. While we accept, as suggested by Bigwood,10 that ‘unarticulated normative premises’ 
of individual judges underlie many decisions and contribute to difficulty in the ‘reconciliation of 
the decisions’, if the meaning of unconscionability within s 51AC is to be elucidated any further, 
some attempt to identify what these normative premises may be is required. As any 
determination of unconscionability is by its nature affected by the context in which the conduct 
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occurs we will focus our examination on the commercial leasing context and the emerging 
trends in recent tribunals (particularly in New South Wales and Victoria11) and court decisions.  
 
To fully appreciate the potential of s 51AC it is appropriate to first examine the current ambit of s 
51AA in a commercial leasing context and how that may influence the use of s 51AC. 
 
Commercial Leasing and Section 51AA 
Section 51AA prohibits a corporation, in trade and commerce, from engaging in conduct that is 
unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law of the States. The section expressly 
provides that it has no application to conduct prohibited by s 51AC or 51AB. This express 
exclusion gave rise to debate amongst commentators as to whether s 51AA would be given a 
broad application encompassing not only Amadio type unconscionability but also duress and 
undue influence or whether that would be incorporated within s 51AC. To date several 
significant decisions on s 51AA in the Federal and High Courts have focussed on the narrow 
situation of a person taking unconscientious advantage of another’s special disadvantage. As 
these decisions involve commercial leases a consideration of each decision is warranted. 
 
The first decision, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty 
Ltd,12 concerned an attempt by a lessee to recover $70,000 paid to a lessor in circumstances 
where the lessee had failed to exercise an option to renew a lease of a business which the 
lessee had just purchased. The court found that the lessee was careless in failing to exercise 
the option on time and was not in a situation of special disadvantage which would have 
rendered the lessor’s demand for the premium unconscionable under s 51AA. The Full Court 
was prepared to characterise a special disadvantage as involving a recognition that it would be 
unconscionable to knowingly deal with the person affected by a disability, “be it ‘constitutional’, 
in a sense of being inherent or ‘situational’, in the sense arising from a particular set of 
circumstances”.13 It is noteworthy that this decision was handed down after the Full Federal 
Court decision of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings 
Pty Ltd (No 2)14 where that court had reversed the trial judge’s finding,15 that the lessor was 
guilty of unconscionable conduct under s 51AA as the lessee was suffering from a special 
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disadvantage, situational in nature, sufficient to attract relief. These two Federal Court decisions 
sent two clear messages. First, that the existence of unequal bargaining power between lessor 
and lessee did not mean the lessee was under a special disadvantage and secondly, that a 
hard bargain does not equate to an unconscionable bargain without more. 
 
These sentiments were given continued life when the High Court, on appeal, considered 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v GC Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd.16 Briefly, in 
that case, the unsuccessful lessees, involved in legal proceedings against the lessor in relation 
to the alleged overcharging of outgoings, wished to assign their lease as part of the process of 
selling their business. They could receive a better price for the business if they could negotiate a 
new term with the lessor. The lessor agreed to the assignment and the grant of a new lease 
provided that the existing lessees discharged the lessor from all claims arising out of the original 
lease, which meant withdrawal of those legal proceedings. The lessees agreed to this under 
some pressure to sell. They then bought proceedings under s 51AA of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 to have the conduct of the lessor, in requiring as a condition of a grant of a new lease that 
the lessees release the lessor from those claims, declared unconscionable. The lessor’s 
conduct was, by majority, held not to be unconscionable “within the meaning of the unwritten 
law”. The High Court’s decision was based on “the well established area of equitable principle 
concerned with the setting aside of transactions where unconscientious advantage has been 
taken by one party of the disabling condition or circumstances of the other”.17 The High Court 
did not consider the broader implications of s 51AA and whether it was limited to matters of 
equitable doctrine such as to exclude its application in circumstances of common law duress or 
economic duress.18 
 
According to most commentators both before and after Berbatis this case leaves the true ambit 
of s 51AA unresolved19 due to the narrow consideration of the High Court. A number of 
commentators have endeavoured on the basis of the High Court’s treatment of s 51AA to 
second guess the extent of the application of s 51AC. Except in what might be obviously called 
                                                 
16
  (2003) 214 CLR 51. 
17
  Ibid at 74 per Gummow, Hayne JJ. 
18
  Such as suggested by the authors in the article “Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: An Exocet in 
Retail Leasing” (1999) 27 Australian Business Law Review 280 at 287-289. 
19
  Before Berbatis: Dietrich, “The Meaning of Unconscionable Conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974” 
(2001) 9 Trade Practices Law Journal 101; Buckley, “Section 51 AA and s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 
1974: The Need for Reform” (2000) 8 Trade Practices Law Journal 5.  
After Berbatis: See Nicole Dean, “Cases and Comments – ACCC v Berbatis Holdings” (2003) 197 ALR 153, 
(2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 254 at 263-266; Bigwood, “Curbing Unconscionability: Berbatis in the High 
Court of Australia” (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 203 at 230-231. 
 5 
extreme cases, prediction as to outcome in this field of scholarship where extrapolation of 
principles are taken from decisions with only an indirect bearing must, of necessity, be treated 
with some caution. However, having said that, it is worth reviewing predictions of commentators 
as some of the only existing guides to the interpretation of s 51AC.   
 
What the Pundits say about Section 51AC Unconscionability 
The majority of commentators agree that the reach of s 51AC would appear to be wider than 
what has come to be termed the “narrow interpretation” by the courts of s 51AA. 
 
Dean20 posed the question as to whether the application of s 51AC would have led to a different 
outcome in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v GC Berbatis Holdings Pty 
Ltd.21 She concluded, after a consideration of the judgment of Sundberg J in Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Simply No Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd,22 that the 
categories of conduct within the scope of s 51AC would be much wider than the narrowly 
interpreted s 51AA.23 However, whilst Dean stated there may be “strong reason” to conclude 
that the lessees in Berbatis “may have had greater success” under s 51AC, her comments fell 
short of anything more definite until further judicial consideration of the section.24 Likewise, 
Webb25 after a consideration of the relevant factors in s 51AC, in light of the first instance 
decision of French J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v GC Berbatis 
Holdings Pty Ltd,26 concluded that had s 51AC been applied a different result may have 
ensued.27 However, Webb’s enthusiastic endorsement of s 51AC as a strong support for 
aggrieved lessees was naturally buoyed by the success of the lessee at the trial at first instance 
and she may have tempered those speculations somewhat by now given the subsequent history 
of that litigation.   
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On the other hand Tucker, 28 in a detailed analysis of s 51AC, also without the benefit of much 
direct case law, considered how the section may be applied to equalise the bargaining position 
of small business relative to larger commercial enterprises. In acknowledging that s 51AC 
employed equitable notions as its touchstone,29 Tucker argued that unless the courts were 
willing to use good faith as a mechanism for broadening the expected moral conduct of 
commercial dealings, the use of unconscionable conduct as a reference point could mean that 
the section fell short of the mark it was intended to make in equalising bargaining power 
between commercial parties.30   
 
Finally Horrigan31 considered that s 51AC was clearly wider in scope than the Amadio – type 
unconscionability and clearly extended to situational disadvantage arising from the matrix of 
commercial and legal circumstances of the parties, at least in terms of the listed statutory indicia 
for unconscionability.32 Horrigan further considered that lessors might be caught by s 51AC not 
only when dealing with someone under an inherent disadvantage because of something 
personal like lack of education, drunkenness or illness but also when dealing with someone in a 
weaker commercial position because of the legal and financial situation which they find 
themselves, noting that the High Court was yet to have a final word on those developments.33  
Both Tucker and Horrigan wrote prior to the High Court’s judgment in Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission v GC Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd.34 
 
The majority of commentators therefore, while prophesising that 51AC will have a wider 
application than 51AA and may extend beyond the notion of taking advantage of a person with a 
constitutional disadvantage, the circumstances in which this may occur have not been examined 
or articulated by the commentators in any detail. 
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Judicial Consideration of Section 51AC to Date 
Is the view of the commentators that s 51AC will have a broader application than 51AA borne 
out in the judicial interpretation of s 51AC? Contrary to the majority, Tucker in 2003 expressed 
the view that as very few cases had succeeded based upon an application of s 51AC this 
tended to indicate that the courts had in substance, afforded unconscionable conduct the same 
conservative connotation as it carried in s 51AA.35  It is unfortunate that most of the decisions 
which have considered the application of s 51AC and its derivatives in State retail leasing 
legislation are decisions of tribunals to which attention will be given later. The most helpful 
decisions of superior courts have, in the main, applied s 51AC in relation to the conduct of 
franchisors against aggrieved franchisees.36 While the decisions in which the franchisees have 
succeeded are overwhelming examples of unconscionable conduct, the decisions indicate that 
the Federal Court, at least, does not consider s 51AC to be constrained by the equitable 
conception of unconscionable conduct in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio,37 
preferring a broader application. 
 
The first decision of note is Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Simply No-
Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd,38 where the allegations against the franchisor were substantial and 
involved serious breaches of the franchise agreement. These included, amongst other things, a 
refusal by the franchisor to discuss matters in dispute with the franchisee despite requests by 
the franchisee to do so, the exclusion of the franchisee from advertising literature of the 
franchise, competing with the franchisee, and the deletion of telephone numbers of the 
franchisees business from directory information. Sundberg J ultimately described this conduct 
as disclosing “an overwhelming case of unreasonable, unfair, bullying and thuggish behaviour in 
relation to the franchisee which amounted to unconscionable conduct under s 51AC(1)”.39 In 
reaching this conclusion, his Honour noted that in his view, the expression “unconscionable” in s 
51AC was not limited to cases of unconscionability as defined by the unwritten law or equity. 
The principal pointer to an enlarged notion of unconscionability in s 51AC lay in the factors to 
which the court might have regard and the fact that these factors were not exhaustive.40  
                                                 
35
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Sundberg J, in this case, clearly stated that he considered that unconscionable conduct was for 
the purpose of s 51AC “at large”.41 
 
A similar, but not as serious, set of facts faced Hasluck J in Auto Masters Australia Pty Ltd v 
Bruness Pty Ltd,42 where an aggrieved franchisee whose franchise had been terminated 
complained of ongoing problems in utilisation of the franchisor’s software leading to 
discrepancies between invoices recorded on a computer system and actual work undertaken.  
Despite continual requests by the franchisee, the franchisor failed to rectify these problems 
which continued and led to the termination of the franchise agreement upon the basis that the 
franchisee had failed to comply with the franchisor’s operation manual for document 
management. There were other disputes which culminated in the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) being involved and ultimately with the ACCC on behalf of the 
franchisee seeking a declaration that the franchisor had engaged in unconscionable conduct in 
breach of s 51AC. The franchisee also alleged a breach of an implied term of good faith to 
which much of the judgment is devoted. However, Hasluck J did consider the extent of the 
operation of the expression “unconscionable” in s 51AC. His Honour commented that he 
considered the section “imports the common law concepts of unconscionability albeit beyond 
the usual bounds of the concept in equity”.43 He considered that the wording of the section was 
clearly intended to prohibit unconscionable conduct in the broad sense in a range of 
transactions.44 In finding the franchisor had infringed s 51AC Hasluck J made a number of 
observations which drew him to that conclusion. First, he considered that it was not necessarily 
unconscionable to terminate a relationship where trust and confidence had been undermined, 
as a party to a contract was entitled to insist upon strict enforcement of its obligations and to 
drive a hard bargain. However, he found that the franchisor had acted capriciously and 
unreasonably in the circumstances, that there was not a sufficient basis to terminate the 
contract, that there was an element of oppression in the franchisor’s conduct which was 
referable to a conscious determination to bring the franchise agreement to an end 
                                                 
41
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42
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notwithstanding an awareness that there was a degree of ambiguity surrounding the allegations 
of default that were being relied upon.45   
 
These few decisions where the concept of unconscionability in the context of s 51AC has been 
seriously argued, lead to the conclusion that s 51AC refers to conduct which goes well beyond 
exploiting a small business operator who is suffering a ‘special disadvantage’. However, while 
the shackles of Amadio have been discarded, in its place the courts are basing their decisions 
on ‘pejorative moral judgments’46 making clear articulation of principles difficult or as some 
suggest impossible.47 The cases illustrate factual matrices of instances where the conduct of the 
party with the superior bargaining power used unfair tactics to bring about the destruction of a 
small business. Interestingly, the court did not in either case consider whether the francishee 
was under some special disadvantage which made the conduct in the circumstances 
unconscionable. The fact that the franchisor was using their superior bargaining power to 
unjustifiably destroy the franchisee’s business was sufficient. Clearly, it is one thing to be in 
breach, even substantial, of an agreement, it is another again to methodically take steps to 
destroy a business relationship. It is that super added quality of malevolence and spite which 
might give what could be termed ordinary contractual misbehaviour its character of 
unconscionability under s 51AC. In the context of the franchise relationship conduct such as 
exploitation of franchisee vulnerability, competing with the franschisee, deliberately ensuring 
franchisee’s business is not advertised, giving arbitrary preference to one operator over another 
and a refusal to mediate a dispute have contributed to findings of unconscionable conduct. 
 
It is, therefore, instructive to consider what type of conduct within a lessor and lessee 
relationship may fall outside of the parameters of a ‘hard bargain’ or enforcement of the lessor’s 
strict legal rights and contain attributes of unconscionable conduct.  
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46
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Emerging Trends in Commercial Leasing 
A clear principle emerging from the decisions on s 51AA and s 51AC is that the use of superior 
bargaining power to drive a hard bargain is unlikely of itself to be unconscionable conduct. The 
burning question for most litigants is; when will the judicial perception of ‘driving a hard bargain’ 
change to ‘unreasonable, unfair, bullying and thuggish behaviour”? Is this a fine and subtle line 
over which a lessor may cross or is the demarcation a lot more distinct? A review of some 
factual situations where unconscionability under s 51AC or its derivatives in state retail shop 
lease legislation has been raised by an aggrieved lessee is  instructive in attempting to answer 
this question, if that is at all possible.   
 
The review of authorities tends to suggest that allegations under the section are being used as a 
type of safety net or catch-all way of describing the conduct of a lessor over a range of spectra, 
some lawful conduct and some not. As shall be seen, the plea of unconscionability by retail 
lessees in most cases failed. In many instances, it appeared to be a last ditch effort to preserve 
the rights of lessees who were otherwise in breach of their own respective obligations or an 
attempt to resurrect rights (for example, option rights) which no longer existed. It is fully 
recognised that Tribunal decisions are not binding upon any court and that in a number of 
instances the plea of unconscionability, whilst argued, was not subjected to the rigorous 
analysis that it would have been in a superior court. Despite this, the Tribunal hearings evidence 
instances in which the plea is likely to be raised by a lessee and as a collective group provide 
an emerging picture of the circumstances in which a judge is likely to find unconscionable 
conduct under s 51AC or its equivalents. 
 
Negotiation of New Lease 
Negotiations for a new lease between lessor and lessee have the clear potential to raise 
allegations from a lessee that the lessor engaged in unconscionable conduct to reach a bargain 
favourable to the lessor. The majority of the High Court decision in Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission v G C Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd48 took the conventional view that mere 
inequality of bargaining power was not, of itself, in the context of s 51AA sufficient to establish a 
special disadvantage.49 In the context of s 51AC “the relative strength of the bargaining 
positions” of the parties50 is one of the matters to which a court may have regard when 
considering whether or not conduct is unconscionable. It also appears from the tribunal and 
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  Ibid at 64, 65 per Gleeson CJ; at  77  per Gummow, Hayne JJ. 
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court decisions that just because the lessor has a superior bargaining position does not of itself 
point to unconscionable conduct.51 Clearly a lessor who acts reasonably and in their own 
commercial interests in negotiating terms of a new contract is unlikely to engage in 
unconscionable conduct. For example, a lessor engaged in protracted negotiations with a 
lessee where the parties were unable to agree on the area of the leased premises or other 
terms would not be acting unconscionably to break off negotiations abruptly and lease the 
premises to a third party.52 A lessor was also held to be acting reasonably where the lessor 
demanded the return of completed documentation under threat of instituting proceedings to 
regain possession of the property.53 The fact that a lessor does not have an existing legal 
relationship with the proposed lessee and therefore, would not be legally bound to offer or agree 
to particular terms, would make it difficult for a lessee to succeed on an unconscionable conduct 
claim in the context of lease negotiations.54 A lessor should be able to drive a hard bargain, 
even incorporating harsh, commercial terms with little concern for unconscionable conduct.55 
Even where the lessee is at a commercial disadvantage in the bargaining process, the right of a 
lessor to negotiate on their own terms is likely to be upheld, especially where the commercial 
disadvantage is of the lessee’s own doing. The situation in ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd56 
provides an example. The lessee through its own negligence failed to exercise the option in the 
lease shortly after buying the business. The lessor was willing to enter negotiations for a new 
lease but only if the lessee paid a premium of $70,000. Although the Federal Court considered 
the application of s 51AA it is unlikely that the situation would be any different under s 51AC. 
The request for a premium was not unlawful and in commercial terms not unreasonable, in 
addition the lessee’s position of disadvantage was created by their own failure to comply with 
the lease.57 The decisions reveal however, that a court’s latitude in respect of a lessor’s conduct 
in negotiations between parties to an existing relationship is less flexible. This is evidenced very 
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  In other words, because one factor taken from s 51AC (3) may exist, it might not point conclusively to the 
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  (2002) 117 FCR 301. 
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  See also Singh v Doulakis [2004] NSWADT 205 where the lessee carried out refurbishment while on a 
month tenancy and during negotiations for a four year term. The lessor never indicated the term would be 
agreed and terminated the lease for breach. No unconscionable conduct was found. 
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clearly in decisions considering the sale of the lessee’s business and consent to assignment 
considered below. 
 
Exercise of Options 
Lessees have sought to rely on unconscionable conduct where options are exercised out of 
time, usually in the belief that the lessor will accept the late exercise. The fact that a lessor is 
entitled to rely on their strict legal rights under the lease has led the New South Wales 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal to refuse relief unless the conduct of the lessor was 
responsible for the late exercise. For example, in Yao v Cambooya Properties Pty Ltd58 the 
lessee alleged that they had informed the lessor verbally that they intended to exercise the 
option for a further term. This verbal advice to the centre manager had been given within time. 
The centre manager realised however that the lessee was unlikely to take the required step of 
giving formal notice despite advising the lessee to seek legal assistance. The lessor denied 
there was a binding obligation to grant a new lease. In refusing the lessee’s claim for 
unconscionable conduct under s 62B of the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), the tribunal applied 
the principle of unconscionability relevant to claims for relief against forfeiture. The clearest case 
of unconscionable conduct in this context was stated by Young J to be where the lessor:  
 
… deliberately avoids the proper attempts of the lessee to exercise the option. However, 
unconscionable conduct may take other forms. It is not necessary that the conduct 
involve some fault on the part of the landlord, though normally that will be the case. 
There will be some cases where it will be unconscionable for the landlord to take 
advantage of a small mistake on the part of a tenant to obtain a windfall.59 
 
Although the lessee was considered by the tribunal to be in a weaker bargaining position and 
did not understand the documents, the tribunal did not consider the conduct of the managing 
agent to amount to unfair tactics or a lack of good faith. 
 
The fact that the lessor’s conduct must in some way be responsible for the failure of the lessee 
to exercise an option is also evident in Awad v Bucasia Pty Ltd60 where the lessee gave a verbal 
intimation that the option would be exercised but then failed to give written notice of exercise 
within time. The lessee alleged that the lessor had not given details of the address for service of 
notices making it difficult to physically serve the lessor. The tribunal found that the late delivery 
                                                 
58
  [2004] NSWADT 55. 
59
  Leads Plus Pty Ltd v Kowho Intercontinental Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 459 at [24]. 
60
  [2003] NSWADT 247. 
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of the notice was due entirely to the negligence of the lessee and that the lessor did not actively 
avoid service or intimate that strict compliance with the lease was not required.  
 
These cases evidence a reliance on the accepted notion of unconscionable conduct as it relates 
to relief against forfeiture. Although there is some perfunctory reference to the listed criteria in s 
51AC the tribunal decided both of these cases by reference to the accepted test of 
unconscionable conduct emanating from Legione v Hateley.61 
 
Lessor’s Failure to Perform Lease Covenants 
The failure or refusal of a lessor to comply with covenants in a lease, particularly in relation to 
repair and exclusive use rights of lessees, has been alleged in several cases to be 
unconscionable. In the case of unconscionable conduct arising out of the state of the repair of 
the premises, the lessee’s claims failed due mainly to a lack of evidence of any obligation on the 
part of the lessor to repair. For example, in Ali v Hazim62 the lessee had a two year lease with 
no express covenant on the lessor to repair structural defects. The lease excluded fair wear and 
tear and structural defects from the lessee’s obligations. The lessee alleged that the refusal of 
the lessor to repair the premises was unconscionable as ultimately the repairs would have to be 
undertaken by the lessee to remain in business. The court concluded that as the lessor did not 
have an obligation to repair, the refusal to undertake the work was not unconscionable.  
 
Lessees have been more successful in alleging unconscionable conduct in relation to exclusive 
use covenants. The general theme permeating both tribunal and court decisions is that a lessor 
who introduces a new tenant, which the lessor knows will detrimentally impact on the business 
of a sitting lessee, is likely to engage in unconscionable conduct. In Foodco Management Pty 
Ltd v Go My Travel Pty Ltd63 a sitting tenant who operated a specialty muffin store commenced 
a claim for unconscionable conduct against the landlord who granted a lease to another tenant 
for a coffee shop also selling muffins. The exclusive use provision prohibited the lessor from 
leasing further premises as a ‘specialty muffin shop’. The evidence presented confirmed that 
muffins were sold from the coffee shop premises, but whether this was a breach of the first 
lease was left to trial. The lessee also alleged that by allowing a competing business to set up in 
close proximity to the muffin shop the lessor may have engaged in unconscionable conduct 
because the lessor knew of the detrimental effect this would have on the lessee’s business. 
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  (1983) 152 CLR 406. 
62
  [2002] VCAT 274. 
63
  [2002] 2 Qd R 249. 
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Wilson J considered that there was a real prospect of the lessee proving unconscionable 
conduct and granted an interlocutory injunction. The facts influencing this decision were: 
 The lessee relied on the lack of a competing business when taking up the lease and 
franchise; 
 The defendant knew the lessee sold a comparatively small range of products and this 
made them vulnerable to competition. 
 
A similar attitude to the conduct of a lessor that impinges on the business of a sitting tenant is 
found in Softplay Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees (WA) Pty Ltd64 where an injunction was granted 
to prevent the lessor setting up in competition with the lessee. The lessee had a lease of 
premises for a child care centre. The lessor as part of a strategy to attract more parents to the 
shopping centre proposed to open and operate a free child minding centre in the complex. The 
lessee did not have the exclusive rights to operate a child care centre within the complex but 
claimed that the lessor’s conduct was unconscionable and a breach of the obligation of good 
faith. Barrett J endorsed the statement in Cameron v Qantas65 that a statutory remedy would 
exist where conduct was ‘clearly unfair or unreasonable or irreconcilable with what is right or 
reasonable’. In granting the injunction Barrett J stated:  
 
There can be no doubt that the existence of free areas [for child minding] will pose an 
appreciable threat to the conduct of the lessee’s business and that threat could have far 
reaching and permanent ramifications [upon the lessee’s business]. 
 
Therefore, despite the lack of an exclusivity clause in the lease the actions of the lessor in 
setting up a business which would so obviously compete with and have a detrimental effect on 
an existing tenant was considered unconscionable.66  
 
Lessor Conduct in the Sale of a Lessee’s Business 
A profitable area for lessees claiming unconscionable conduct has been in relation to 
interference or unfair tactics used by lessors in the course of negotiations for the sale of the 
lessee’s business. Lessors who engage in conduct such as approaching the potential buyer 
separately and offering alternative premises or attempting to impose restrictions on the 
assignee not present in the lease have been viewed unfavourably by courts and tribunals. 
                                                 
64
  [2002] NSWSC 1059. 
65
  (1995) 55 FCR 147. 
66
  This should be contrasted with Bischof v Werncog Pty Ltd [2004] NSWADT where the lessor allowed a 
lessee to trade outside the permitted use affecting a rival tenant but the permission was limited in time. 
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Several tribunal decisions in New South Wales have signalled little sympathy for a lessor who 
interferes in the sale process of a tenant. In Worsfold v de Goede67 the lessee purchased a 
grocery shop in small country town and entered into possession with the lessor’s knowledge (no 
formal consent). After 3 months the lessee was approached to sell the business. The lessor 
dealt directly with the prospective purchaser endeavouring to cut the lessee out of the picture 
and stifle the sale. The lessor refused a request for a formal fixed term lease having already 
approached the proposed purchaser directly. Within a short period of the proposed sale the 
lessor initiated a smear campaign against the lessee with a view to forcing the lessee out. 
Concurrently, the lessor sent an “eviction notice” citing unpaid rent, breach of the use clause 
and breach of health regulations. The lessee vacated the premises and subsequently the 
potential buyer entered into possession under a lease to the lessor. The tribunal concluded that 
the lessor acted unconscionably by engaging in ‘unfair tactics’ which ‘fractured’ the relationship 
of the lessee and potential buyer thereby depriving the lessee of the sale of the goodwill of the 
business.68 The crucial factor which appears to give the lessor’s conduct the requisite quality of 
unconscionability is the interference in the prospective sale by the lessee. It follows that a lessor 
who engages in negotiations directly with a potential assignee only after it is obvious no deal will 
be reached between the lessee and assignee will not be acting unconscionably. In Walls Gifts 
and Tobacco Pty Ltd v Warringah Mall Pty Ltd,69 although the lessee failed in their 
unconscionable conduct claim due to the remoteness of their reaching an agreement with the 
potential buyer, the tribunal confirmed its view that a lessor who seeks to interfere in the 
potential sale of a lessee’s business with a view to enticing the potential buyer to take up a 
different lease in the centre will be considered to have been acting unconscionably. 
 
Even though a lessor may not interfere in the negotiations between a lessee and potential buyer 
with a view to offering different premises, the conduct can still be unconscionable if the lessor 
uses the sale as an opportunity to alter the permitted use of the premises. In Castle Mall Fine 
Foods Pty Ltd v QIC70 the lease of a retail shop stated the use to be “Coffee Shop” but the 
lessor over a lengthy period permitted the lessee to sell “take-away food”. The take-away 
element accounted for about 25% of the turnover for the business. The lessee sought the 
lessor’s consent to assignment of the lease, but the lessor would only give consent if the proper, 
but more limited, use as stated in the lease was observed by the assignee. The assignee was 
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  [2002] NSWADT 273. 
68
  Ibid at [24]. 
69
  [2003] NSWADT 161. 
70
  [2003] NSWADT 207. 
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not prepared to accept this condition and the lessee claimed the lessor’s conduct was 
unconscionable. The tribunal considered that it was undesirable for a lessor to use the context 
of a possible sale of the business as the forum in which to claw back trading activities of the 
lessee, especially as the take-away trading of the lessee had not been challenged over the 
previous three years. Factors considered relevant to a finding of unconscionable conduct were: 
 The relative bargaining positions of the parties – the lessor being a large national 
investment fund represented by a large law firm and the lessee a small business; 
 The fact the changes were not necessary to protect the lessor’s legitimate business; 
 The undue influence and unfair tactics of the lessor who approached the prospective 
lessee directly rather than voicing concerns to the existing lessee; 
 Failing to inform the lessee that the prospective lessee would be approached thereby 
risking the sale. 
 
The clear message from each of these cases is that a lessor who interferes with the sale of a 
lessee’s business with the purpose of attracting the prospective buyer to other premises of the 
lessor or obtaining some additional commercial advantage which is unreasonable risks a finding 
of unconscionable conduct by a tribunal or court.  
 
Termination of Lease 
The final area in which lessees have claimed unconscionable conduct by lessors is in the 
exercise of rights of termination under the lease. Clearly a lessor who seeks to exercise a valid 
right to terminate will not be acting unconscionably by relying on their strict legal rights.71 A 
successful claim of unconscionable conduct by a lessee will usually require evidence that the 
lessor has an ulterior motive for the termination and is acting unreasonably in relying on the 
strict rights in the lease to achieve a particular outcome. For example, in Sarker v World Best 
Holdings Ltd72 the first lessee operated an “Indian Grocery”. The lessor without regard to the 
existing exclusive use of the lessee agreed to the second lessee opening an “Asian Grocery”. 
There was obvious overlap in the foods able to be sold under each exclusive use and the first 
lessee complained. Instead of negotiating a resolution the lessor terminated the Asian Grocery 
relying upon the failure of the second tenant to comply with fitout requirements and to provide a 
bank guarantee. The tribunal considered that the lessor’s conduct was unconscionable as it 
                                                 
71
  See for example Bakker v Capitol Arcade (VCAT – R 13/2000 2 February 2000), termination of a monthly 
tenancy after 13 years by 6 weeks’ notice was not unconscionable. Campbell v Astill [2004] NSWADT 55: 60 
days notice of a 22% increase in rent for periodic tenancy after no increase for 3 years not unconscionable.  
72
  [2004] NSWADT 119. 
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sought to rely upon its own failure to manage the fit out process or to insist on a guarantee to 
solve a commercial error of its own making.73 In other words the lessor was seeking to rely on 
the strict obligations in the lease to achieve an outcome for itself (ie the release of any liability to 
the first tenant for breaching the exclusive use provision of the lease). Similarly in Irresistable 
Frocks v Sparbac and Roche74 the lessee had provided a bank guarantee to the lessor which 
could be called up in the event of breach without notice to the lessee. The lessor assigned the 
freehold subject to the lease with the original guarantee in place. The guarantee was personal 
and could not be assigned, therefore the old lessor and new lessor entered into an arrangement 
whereby the old lessor would at the direction of the new lessor call upon the guarantee if 
requested. The lessee decided not to exercise its option and advised that a new lessee (Tinine) 
was interested in the premises. A new lease was entered into between Tinine and the lessor. A 
dispute in relation to the removal of fitout at the expiry of the lease arose and the lessor 
prevailed upon the previous lessor to call up the guarantee as a means of paying for the 
removal. The tribunal considered that the lessor had no right to call upon the guarantee as the 
original lessee was not responsible. The tribunal considered that the fact the entitlement to call 
upon the guarantee was very unclear and it was called upon without reference to the previous 
lessee both contributed to the finding of unconscionable conduct. The lessor was looking for an 
easy way of recovering the cost of removing the fitout which should have been enforced against 
the new lessee. 
 
 
Comments and Conclusions 
 
Comments 
Does the growing body of tribunal and court decisions reveal any emergent principles or norms 
upon which judges are making determinations of unconscionable conduct?  
 
The first observation that can be made is that the underlying principles of freedom and sanctity 
of contract that give rise to the notion of a free and competitive bargaining process between 
commercial parties, appear in some way to impact on most judges’ conscience based 
reasoning. This is evident in two respects. First, the clearly expressed requirement that 
something more than reliance upon strict legal rights is required to render the conduct of a 
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lessor unfair, unreasonable, immoral or wrong. It is generally assumed that parties having 
agreed to terms within their lease are bound by and subject to the exercise of those rights by 
the lessor. This has led to tribunals and courts concluding that unconscionable conduct does not 
arise where substantial rent increases are demanded in accordance with the lease,75 a lessor 
refuses to agree to accept the late exercise of an option by a lessee,76 or a lessor terminates a 
lease for breach despite ongoing negotiations for a new lease.77 Secondly, significant latitude is 
given to a lessor in negotiations for a new lease in the absence of any legal obligation to grant 
one. The fact that requests by a landlord for large premiums for the grant of the lease,78 
significant rental increases,79 cancellation of negotiations after tenant has refurbished the 
premises80 and threatening to cancel the lease if documents are not returned81 were not 
considered to be unconscionable, suggests that most judges consider that good conscience 
does not require a lessor to give up a commercial advantage or neglect their own interests.82 It 
could be suggested that the importance of this principle within the psyche of most judges is 
borne out by the fact that in none of the decisions examined did a lessee succeed in a claim of 
unconscionable conduct in the negotiation of a lease, despite the fact in several cases the 
lessee was at a distinct commercial disadvantage vis-à-vis the landlord.83 
 
The second observation from the surveyed authorities is that most judges appear unconstrained 
by the equitable notion of unconscionability and in particular the requirement for the lessor to 
exploit the disadvantage of the lessee in some way. Regular reference to the dictionary 
meaning of “unconscionable” has resulted in the acceptance by most judges of a requirement 
for ‘serious misconduct or something clearly unfair or unreasonable.’84 The basis, upon which a 
court may find that the conduct fits these subjective criteria, however, is often unarticulated with 
the tribunal or court merely reaching an impressionistic conclusion that in the circumstances, the 
                                                 
75
  Campbell v Astill [2004] NSWADT 55: 60 days notice of a 22% increase in rent for periodic tenancy after no 
increase for 3 years was not unconscionable. 
76
  Yao v Cambooya Properties Pty Ltd [2004] NSWADT 55; Awad v Bucasia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWADT 247. 
77
  Bakker v Capitol Arcade (VCAT – R 13/2000 2 February 2000).  
78
  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 117 FCR 301. 
79
  Humphries & Cooke Pty Ltd v Essendon Airport Limited [2001] VCAT 2439. 
80
  Singh v Doulakis [2004] NSWADT 205 and One Stop Lighting (Qld) v Lifestyle Property Developments Pty 
Ltd (1999) Q Conv R 54-527, 60,260 at 60,268 where Chesterman J held not to be unconscionable in the 
circumstances for the lessor to break off negotiations at the last minute where no concluded agreement had 
been reached. 
81
  Laserbeam Pty Ltd v Gainsville Investments Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 62. 
82
  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v GC Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51 at  
64. 
83
  See for example Humphries & Cooke Pty Ltd v Essendon Airport Limited [2001] VCAT 2439 (340% increase 
in rent after refurbishment of premises); Singh v Doulakis [2004] NSWADT 205 (negotiations terminated 
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conduct is or is not unconscionable. Rarely is any reference made to the respective bargaining 
positions of the parties85 or whether the lessor had taken advantage of the lessee’s situation 
with the majority of judges concentrating on the conduct of the lessor in the context of the pre-
existing commercial relationship. Only a small number of judges endeavour to justify their 
decision, usually a finding of unconscionable conduct, by reference to the listed criteria in s 
51AC, giving the impression the factors were used more as an afterthought.  
 
Thirdly, a court is most likely to conclude that the requisite degree of unfairness, 
unreasonableness or immoral conduct occurs where the lessor detrimentally interferes with the 
existing business of the lessee. The preponderance of cases suggest that a lessor will be acting 
unconscionably where he or she deals directly with the prospective assignee of the lease, 
behind the back of the outgoing assignor with the effect of preventing the sale and enticing the 
prospective lessee to take up the lease of other premises.86 This type of conduct on the part of 
the lessor is unorthodox, unnecessary, and could be construed as a deliberate attempt to 
minimise the opportunities of an outgoing lessee to maximise their gains on a sale of their 
business with no potential gain to the lessor.87 Similarly, where a lessor blatantly ignores the 
exclusivity provisions of a lease by agreeing to another tenant selling similar products or 
attempts to subvert a lessee’s business by setting up their own business, a court is likely to 
conclude that a lessor who takes advantage of their position knowing it will impact detrimentally 
on the business of other tenants is acting unfairly and unreasonably to the degree necessary for 
a finding of unconscionable conduct. 
 
The cases in which interference with a lessee’s business is considered unfair and unreasonable 
highlight the need for conduct to be more than unfair in a general sense, but for some moral 
wrongdoing or deliberate exploitation of the lessee’s position to also have occurred. For 
instance it may appear “unfair” for a lessee to be denied a new lease upon the late exercise of 
an option, but it is not unconscionable for a lessor to take advantage of that unfortunate 
occurrence and exercise strict legal rights in not granting a new lease. Similarly, the mere 
refusal by a lessor to consent to the assignment of a lease whether reasonable or unreasonable 
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is not unconscionable conduct. On the other hand, a lessor who deliberately set about 
destroying the lessee’s business with a view to terminating the relationship and putting in 
another lessee carries a requisite degree of moral unfairness. In this context, the leasing cases 
follow a similar line to the franchise cases considered previously. 
 
Conclusions 
 Many of the outcomes of the court and tribunal decisions in relation to alleged unconscionability 
in retail leasing, to an extent, bear out the few judicial considerations of s 51AC. However, they 
are of limited utility for lessees proposing litigation as whether or not a fact situation postulated 
gives rise to unconscionable conduct on the part of one party or the other, in the absence of an 
extreme element in the conduct or some judicial decision virtually on point, is almost impossible 
to accurately predict. The factual matrices giving rise to the allegations of unconscionability are 
often extremely complex, and as highlighted in the survey of cases, express articulation of 
relevant criteria is rare. Bigwood, who offered his reflections on the High Court’s decision and 
reasoning in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v GC Berbatis Holdings Pty 
Ltd,88 “with some trepidation” said that “attempting to provide a coherent conceptual account of 
the variform subject matter of a ‘unconscionable conduct’, is much like “opening a can of worms 
and them trying to contain them in a string bag”.89 With that same trepidation we have attempted 
to articulate some reflections on the judicial attitudes slowly appearing in the authorities within a 
commercial leasing context. While the authorities indicate a practically unanimous willingness to 
give unconscionability in s 51AC a broad meaning, the situations in which a lessor will be 
considered to have acted unfairly, unreasonably or immorally are limited. Although the 
boundaries of the concept are unclear one clear premise is emerging in claims by lessees under 
s 51AC. A lessee who claims unconscionable conduct must prove the lessor is doing something 
more than taking advantage of their strict legal rights. The circumstances in which the lessor’s 
conduct will be considered morally unfair or unreasonable are limited and are likely to require 
proof that the lessor is using or manipulating their legal rights or position to force  the 
termination of a lease or cessation of a business.  
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